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Is it Really so Easy to Model Biological Evolution
in Terms of Design-free Cumulative Selection?
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Abstract:  Without directly taking sides in the design/anti-design debate, this paper defends the 
following  position:  the  assertion  that  biological  evolution  “is”  design-free  presupposes  the 
possibility to model biological evolution in a design-free way. 
Certainly, there are design-free models of evolution based on cumulative selection. But “to model” 
is a  verb denoting “modeling” as the  process leading to a model. So  any modeling –  trivially – 
needs  “previous human design.”
Nevertheless,  contrary to  other  scientific  activities  which  legitimately consider  models  while 
ignoring the process leading to them, evolution theory must take into account the human activity of 
modeling required by its corresponding  models.
0. Introduction
Having stirred up passions, the debate around ID is a false debate where people are not talking 
about the same thing.
As long as  sharing  faith  in  God is  not  definitively assimilated to  a  psychiatric  symptom,  it  is  
legitimate that believers do not wish to reduce their faith to some kind of surrealism just tolerated,  
provided that it is not taken seriously. So, in the eyes of  believers, the belief in God's Creation can 
imply several  conceptions of a biological evolution previously designed by the Creator. 
I would be the last to deny the sound principle saying that faith and rational science are not to be 
confused (comp. Collins 2006, pp. 5 ff.). Or, more precisely, going perfectly together with scientific 
knowledge, faith should not  enter within scientific argumentation.
However, the sound principle of non-confusion between science and faith does also operate in the  
opposite sense. Scientific knowledge should not be used as an argument  against faith. Indeed, it 
seems reasonable to consider faith as a special  case of metaphysics, knowing that the potential 
negations of metaphysical approaches are in turn metaphysical approaches. 
Nonetheless,  does  science  –  here,  the  synthetic  theory of  biological  evolution  –  systematically 
respect the principle of non-confusion between science and faith? This is not sure. Richard Dawkins 
represents  a  living  example  of  a  scientist  who  really  feels  able  to  prove  “scientifically”  the 
“nonsense” of faith and so of the faith in ID  assumed as faith and nothing but faith.  (Dawkins, 
2006, p. 50)
The unique way to call into question the faith in ID without veering towards a mixture of science 
and metaphysics  perhaps would be to show that scientific understanding of biological evolution 
does not need ID to remain consistent. Yes, but in order to do so, defenders of such an approach 
should be certain that they really understand what could be an ID-free biological evolution.
Now, there  is  a  heuristic  principle  to  be taken into  account:  being  able  to  model what  we are 
supposed to understand does not ensure our real understanding. By contrast, if we are not able to 
model what we are supposed to understand, then that  we are supposed to understand is certainly 
not understood. So, before asking whether biological evolution as such is design-free or not, are we 
able to model evolution in a design-free way?
The  present  paper  shows  that  a  design-free  modeling  of  biological  evolution is  merely  
unimaginable.
According to the current synthetic theory, real biological evolution is “motorized” by an interaction 
between pure chance and randomly configured constraints, an interaction we will elucidate in terms 
of  “cumulative  selection.”  From the  standpoint  of  the  synthetic  theory,  this  “motorization”  can 
function  without   previous  design  emanating  from God  or  any other  intelligent  entity.  So,  to 
correspond to a design-free biological  evolution,  a human-made model of  evolution necessarily 
must operate without any design previously emanating from humans. But is this possible?
Certainly,  there  are  models where  something  –  perhaps  –  comparable  to  biological  evolution 
evolves “blindly.” We will come back to this point. But recall that “a model” and “modeling” are 
not the same thing. “Modeling” denotes the process leading to a model. So, to consider a modeling 
in a complete manner,  we have to take into account (i)  the human intelligence required by the 
modeling in  question,  as well  as  (ii)  the  resources implemented in  this  process according to  a 
previously conceived strategy.
Of  course,  the  foregoing  will  meet  predictable  objections.  First,  scientific  work  exclusively  
considers models as such, and not the elaboration of these models, nor the resources implemented  
in the elaboration process. So, all that should concern us is the design-free functioning of the model  
of  evolution.  By  contrast,  the  trivial  fact  that  any  modeling  as a human-conceived  process  by  
definition presupposes human design is to ignore.
Another probable objection may be that  the essentially human-conceived and subsequently non-
design-free  aspect  of  modeling  as  a  process  concerns  the  elaboration  of  models  not  only  of  
biological evolution, but of any other phenomenon to be investigated.
Yes, the foregoing objections – please pay attention to the conditional – would be right in most 
scientific areas beginning by physics.
But this paper will show that  biological evolution represents an exception, and more precisely that  
in the area of biological evolution, considering a model of biological evolution without taking into  
account the required modeling resources would deprive the model of the essential.   
0.1 Some short precisions concerning models and modeling
Let us say that in our context a theoretical description TD is a model M of a system Σ if there are (i) 
a one-to-one-relation Φ between the items belonging to TD and certain characteristics attributed to 
the given system Σ to be described by TD, and (ii) appropriated means to test the adequacy of the 
one-to-one-relation TD  ←  Φ → Σ  in an experimental or experimentation-like way. In our context, 
we  consider  as  “experimentation-like”  computer  simulations replacing  experimentation  stricto  
sensu  where the latter is not possible. Here, these a bit reducing proposals are sufficient; for a less 
reducing view, see Peschard, 2010, p.20.
Recall that “modeling”, in our context, denotes the global process dedicated simultaneously (i) to 
the construction of the model  M as a special case of a theoretical description  TD and (ii) to the 
implementation of the resources required by the experimentation-like approach specifying certain 
aspects of TD as a model M.
0.2 Overview
In section 1 we will see why contrary to other scientific areas legitimately ignoring the modeling 
process leading to the considered models, an evolution theory wishing to carry adequate models is 
not authorized to separate the latter from the corresponding modeling.
Section 2 is dedicated to the meaning of “cumulative selection” and to the fact that cumulative 
selection is easy to model as long as there is  given selection device. However, since according to 
synthetic theories nothing is previously given in evolution, the necessity of given devices within 
modeling of cumulative selection leads to insurmountable problems.   
Section 3 approaches several simulations of biological evolution, more or less convincing thanks to 
given selection devices. Subsequently, section 3. also evokes the – utopian –  idea of simulations of 
biological evolution where the implemented  selection devices instead of being given, are in turn 
configured by cumulative selection.
Finally section 4 shows that even the virtual realization of such de facto unrealizable simulations 
would not be adequate with biological evolution insofar we know it, while recalling that  contrary to 
other scientific disciplines, evolution theory must take into account the resources required by the 
realization of a model.
1. Why can we consider physical  models without taking into account the 
corresponding modeling? Why is this not the case for models of biological 
evolution?      
1. Models and modeling in physics
Consider a model of an astrophysical process, say the formation of a new star from a a large gas  
cloud.  To  test  the  model  under  at  least  experimentation-like  conditions,  we  need  a  computer 
simulation as is for example proposed by Tegmark in an accessible way (see Tegmark, 2014 pp. 38 
ff.). Now, the simulation, in order not to be reduced to a kind of computer game, necessarily must 
be programmed according to the concerned physical laws as we know them. Of course, writing the  
corresponding program belongs to human design, whereas the computer resources required by any  
program are in turn designed by humans. Nevertheless, in physics, a model which – as usual – does 
not take into account this form of “human design” remains adequate with regard to the phenomenon 
to be modeled. Indeed,  we can do physics – i.e. explain physical phenomena according to known 
physical laws and/or discover new physical laws –  without asking  where these laws are coming 
from, or who programmed them in which way. So, conversely, it is legitimate to consider just the 
simulation as such, without asking by whom the simulation had been programmed. Analogously, we 
can  legitimately  neglect  the  resources the “designer” of  the  simulation  program had needed to 
execute her/his task. 
Now, there is a question: why just physics can ignore the modeling resources behind its models? 
The relatively simple answer consists of the following three closely related points. (i) Physical laws 
remain identical through the history of our universe. (ii) Although nowadays physical law generally 
require advanced mathematics, the structure of these laws is astonishingly simple. (iii) For group-
theoretic reasons we cannot explore here (see Punin, 2016, pp. 6 ff. 11), the specific investigation 
field of  physics  allows a distortion-free approach of  physical  systems taken out  of  their  wider 
context.  Since  physical  laws  are  easy  to   identify  because  of  their  structural  simplicity  while 
remaining unchanged under time as well as through the passage from any context to another one, 
we can consider them as given.
Finally, add that – unless we accept the genuine  circularity approaches conceiving physical laws 
emerging “with”  the  physical  phenomena  expressing  these  laws  –  physical  laws  must  precede 
ontologically the physical phenomena occurring all along the history of our universe. However, 
since it is possible to make physics without taking into account ontology, a simulation of the history 
of the physical universe remains adequate without taking into account the resources behind the 
simulation and, subsequently, the fact that these resources require “intelligent human design.”   
1.2 Models and modeling in theory of  evolution
In this subsection, we will see that contrary to physical simulations, honest simulations of biological 
evolution should not neglect their resources issued from human design. 
Physical laws recognizable as such and remaining identical over time impact biological evolution. 
But,  by definition, biological evolution is not reducible to the sole physical laws intervening in it. 
The occurrence of more and more sophisticated organisms – whether the “motorization” of the 
process may be “cumulative selection” (see below) or something else – necessarily goes together 
with more and more complex configurations of physical laws CPL i. Concerned by physical laws 
but, obviously, without belonging to the investigation field of physics as such, biological evolution 
enters into the domain science just is beginning to identify in terms of “inter-theory relations”, a 
domain undermined by controversies about – among others – “[the] hierarchy of levels (levels of 
organization/levels of description), part/whole relations, the fact of emergence )(...), the relevance 
of scales (...)” (Castellani, 2012, p.6), while asking “whether the relation of the units on level Li+1 
(coarser)  to  the  units  on  level  Li (finer)  [are]  better  described  in  terms  of:  reduction  to, 
supervenience on, emergence from?” (Castellani, 2012, p.7). Under these conditions, all we can say 
is that within a design-free biological evolution there are – once again by definition – no  given 
“meta-laws” governing the transitions from some configuration of physical laws CPLi  to a more 
complex one CPLi+1. 
Since there are no given “meta-laws” governing the transitions from some configuration of physical 
laws  CPLi  to  a  more  complex  one  CPLi+1,  this  time  we  necessarily  have  to  ask where  the 
CPLi, CPLi+1, … …  come from.
Of course, the synthetic theory of evolution asserts that there is an answer to this issue, an answer in 
terms of design-free cumulative selection. 
Nevertheless, recall that especially in the context of biological evolution where experimentation 
stricto sensu is not possible, modeling is the only way to test theoretical approaches of biological 
evolution  under  experimentation-like  conditions.  (see  subsection  0.1)  The  assertion  that  (i) 
biological evolution is exclusively driven by an entirely design-free cumulative selection, and  that 
(ii) among all the factors acting on evolution, we find no one related to any form of previous design, 
this assertion belongs until further notice to the theoretical approaches of biological evolution, and, 
for this reason, remains to be tested. Concerning point (i), it may be acceptable to consider just a 
design-free simulation of cumulative selection, without asking whether all the resources required by 
the simulation are in turn design-free. But concerning point (ii), the things are essentially different. 
To  test  under  experimentation-like  conditions  the  assertion  that  no factor  acting  on biological 
evolution as such is  related to any previous design, we should at least be able to conceive a design-
free simulation of cumulative selection whose required resources in turn occur in a design-free way.
So,  in  the very special  context  of  biological  evolution,  the notions  “design-free modeling”  and 
“design-free modeling” cannot be separated.  
By contrast, if we decree that in nature, there are “some” design-free factors replacing the design-
related resources required by a simulation of evolution, then we merely forget the raison d'être of 
the  simulation  being  a  test.  In  other  words,  we  confuse  the  demonstrandum with  a  departure 
hypothesis formulated ad hoc.
2. Single-step selection and cumulative selection by small steps
According to the current “synthetic theory” of biological evolution, the latter is “motorized” by 
design-free “cumulative selection.” So we have to ask whether design-free modeling of cumulative 
selection is possible. Section 2. opens an inference showing that design-free modeling of cumulative 
selection, de facto not possible, could be envisaged only in virtual way, and that even if  this virtual 
modeling were realizable, it would not lead to a relevant model of  real biological evolution.
2.1 The meaning of “cumulative selection”
Biological evolution is characterized by the occurring of quasi-infinitely high improbabilities which 
cannot be issued from pure chance. It would be hopeless to expect that a monkey typing randomly 
on a keyboard would produce the small sentence “I am a monkey.”, (Misra, 2015, p.1) whereas the 
occurrence by chance of just  a  cell  is  infinitely more improbable than such a  random monkey 
performance. 
So, according to synthetic theories of biological evolution, the latter results not from pure chance, 
but from “cumulative small-step selection.”
Personally,  I  have  never  found a   real  definition of  “cumulative  selection”,  only more  or  less 
compact/clear  descriptions. Indeed, to be possible, cumulative selection implies several non-self-
evident presuppositions which may vary from case to case.
So, at least let us try to encompass the possibility of cumulative selection. First there must be a  
constraint   C and  a  system  ΣC supposed to  approach  as  well  as  possible  the  state  S*(ΣC)  the 
constraint  C tends to  impose to  ΣC.  On the other hand, occupying any possible state S i(ΣC),  the 
system ΣC must be able to express for each Si(ΣC) random fluctuations Δ+Si(ΣC) and Δ P Si(ΣC), where 
the  Δ+Si(ΣC) and  Δ P Si(ΣC) respectively approach  ΣC to S*(ΣC) and moves  ΣC  away from S*(ΣC). 
Finally,  for  ΣC to  support  cumulative  small-step  selection,  there  must  be  a  selection  device 
associated to ΣC  – let us note it  ASD(ΣC ) – which, recognizing both Δ+Si(ΣC)  and  Δ P Si(ΣC), allows 
only the Δ+Si(ΣC) while forbidding the Δ P Si(ΣC).
Under these conditions, ΣC initially occupying any state Si(ΣC) necessarily tends to S*(ΣC).
Now, two closely related important  remark remain to be formulated.  (i)  The  tendency of  ΣC to 
approach S*(ΣC) does not not necessarily mean that S*(ΣC) is reached. (see subsection 3.123). (ii) 
S*(ΣC) is not necessarily known. (see  3.12) So,  as such, cumulative selection can be conceived 
without any previous design.
However, there are at least two things which, instead of being treated with an incredible flimsiness, 
must be seriously underlined. (i) For cumulative selection to be possible for  ΣC, C and ΣC must go 
together. Far from being self-evident, the compatibility between  C and  ΣC encounters higher and 
higher improbabilities as ΣC becomes more and more complex. (ii) Since for cumulative selection to 
be possible for ΣC, there must be a selection system ASD(ΣC) associated to ΣC , going together with 
C and ΣC  ,  without  belonging to  ΣC,  we  at  least  potentially have to  ask  where the necessarily 
improbable ASD(ΣC)  comes from. Now, in fact, most often (see subsection 1.2), this question can 
be neglected, but  (see subsection 1.2) it is easy to prove that just  within any attempt to explain 
biological  evolution  by  cumulative  selection,  neglecting  this  question  means  neglecting  the 
essential.
The following parts of the paper will be directly or indirectly centered on the foregoing points (i)  
and (ii).
2.2 An intuitive modeling of cumulative selection; Maxwell's Demon as an associated selection 
device ASD(ΣC)
Although  having  been  conceived  for  a  different  purpose  –  to  show  that  the  Second  Law  of 
Thermodynamics, far from being a law of nature stricto sensu, just denotes the human inability of 
generating work by entropy reduction (comp. Myrvold, 2011, pp. 2, 5 ff.) – the thought experiment 
well-known  as  “Maxwell's  Demon”  represents  a  good  example  of  modeling  of  cumulative 
selection. 
Here a very simplified version of the Demon is sufficient. Imagine a box divided into two parts A 
and  B  by by a  partition  comprising  a  microscopic  open  hole.  The  box  contains  a  gas  whose 
molecules initially are located in say the half A. But over time, the molecules tend to be equally 
distributed in the two halves A and B of the box. Now it would be quasi-infinitely improbable to see 
the system spontaneously return to its initial state. Indeed, the concentration of all molecules in the 
half A is just one among a quasi-infinity of possible configurations.  It would be hopeless to expect 
the return of the system to its initial state under single-step selection conditions. 
Now,  let  Maxwell's  Demon  operate.  As  a  mathematical  limit,  the  most  probable  state  of  the 
molecule system consists of the exactly equal number of molecules in both halves A and B, but in  
fact,  the system describes very slight  fluctuations around its  most  probable state.  Sometimes a 
molecule coming from A passes through the hole and enters into B. Sometimes it is the same in the 
opposite sense. Now admit that a microscopic ultra-intelligent entity – “Maxwell's Demon” –  after 
having installed a little gate at the hole, opens the gate when a molecule randomly passes from B to 
A, while closing the gate when a molecule randomly passes from A to B. Under these cumulative  
selection conditions the system actually tends to its quasi-infinitely improbable initial state, which 
would be unimaginable under these single-step selection conditions.    
Concerning the original vocation of the Demon: to show that entities performing better than simple 
humans can violate the Second Law, a large majority of theoreticians thinks – for diverging reasons; 
you can find a exhaustive overview in  Gijsbers, 2004 – that the Demon cannot do its job. By 
contrast, consuming energy and subsequently respecting the Second Law, the Demon represents an 
adequate  model of  a  particular  case  of  cumulative  selection  leading  to   higher  and  higher 
organization.  Note that the development of living organisms requires factors we can qualify as 
“Maxwellian-Demon-like.” (Kurzynski and Chelminiak, 2016, pp. 9f.)
However, simultaneously the Demon as a  model of cumulative selection expresses the principal 
difficulties striking any attempt of design-free  modeling. Obviously, Maxwell had conceived his 
thought experiment according to his “previous design”, whereas the Demon works “ consciously” 
according to  a  previously defined project,  but  for  the  moment,  we leave  this  issue aside.  (see 
subsection  3.1) Here we just have to recall and to underline that, for  cumulative selection to be 
possible for a random system  ΣC,  there must be a selection system ASD(ΣC) associated to  ΣC  , 
going  together with  the  constraint  C and ΣC  ,  without  belonging to  ΣC.  Now,  it  is  clear  that 
Maxwell's model requires an entity not only extraordinarily capable, but above all “made for” the 
task it is supposed to execute over a system as such limited to a molecule box and its molecules,  
knowing that the Demon does not belong to the system as such. Denying this point would resemble 
the not very adequate assertion that a given software  made for a specific task  also could do any 
task. Of course, synthetic theories of biological evolution notoriously claim that natural selection as 
a special case of cumulative selection “has” a design-free solution for this problem. Well, but if 
instead  of  asserting what  allegedly  does happen  within  evolution  “motorized”  by  design-free 
cumulative selection,  we first  try  to  model all  this  assertion in  a  globally design-free  way,  we 
manifestly have to expect great difficulties. 
The coming pages are dedicated to a more detailed approach of the foregoing. Meanwhile, we have 
to point out that what for the moment is just a simple observation we nevertheless later will have to 
generalize. Operating as an associated cumulative selection device, the Demon certainly makes the 
molecule system tend to a final state whose actual occurrence under single-step selection conditions 
would  be  unimaginably  improbable.  Yes,  but  the  actual  occurrence  under  single-step  selection 
conditions of the Demon itself would be even more improbable than the unimaginably improbable 
final  state  of  the  molecule  system.  So,  within  Maxwell's  thought  experiment,  the  cumulative 
selection  process  allowing  the  considered  system  to  reach  has  a  “cost”:  the  single-step 
improbability affecting the required associated selection device is unimaginably higher than the  
single-step improbability affecting the target of the thought experiment.
2.21 The hypothesis of external improbability associated to cumulative selection
Let us try to generalize the foregoing in the following way:
Hypothesis (H2.21) For a given random system ΣC to reach through a cumulative selection process 
CSP(ΣC  )  the target  S*(ΣC)  whose occurrence by single-step selection would be affected by an 
improbability Imp(S*(ΣC)), there must be an associated selection device ASD(ΣC) whose occurrence 
by single-step selection is affected by an improbability  Imp(ASD(ΣC)),  so that  Imp(ASD(ΣC)) is 
higher than Imp(S*(ΣC)).    
2.22 About the status of the hypothesis (H2.21)
Certainly I have not invented the hypothesis   (H2.21). Quite the contrary,  common sense could 
suggest  that  the  patent  evidence  of   (H2.21)  makes  its  qualification  as  a  “hypothesis”  rather 
pompous.  And yet,  (H2.21)  is  a hypothesis, and above all  a hypothesis  of a very special  kind. 
(H2.21)  apparently is  obvious,  but  this  appearance  is  deceptive.  More  precisely,  the  apparent 
evidence of (H2.21) is a special case of the false evidence of irreversibility. Of course, living at the 
macroscopic scale, we are  familiar with all the irreversibility around us, but being familiar with 
something does not mean knowing the thing in question. Indeed, the philosophical controversy over 
whether  irreversibility is  law-like or  just  fact-like goes back to  Boltzmann himself,  even if  the 
formulation in terms of  law-like/fact-like  irreversibility as such was introduced by Mehlberg in 
1961. (Mehlberg, 1961, pp. 126, 128). Maxwell's Demon playing a relatively important role in this 
paper is a typical product of the  law-like  v/s  fact-like irreversibility debate which, engaging great 
and the greatest physicists and/or philosophers, still continues today. As long as the debate is not 
decided, the principle of scientific cautious orders us to opt for  fact-like irreversibility. So (H2.21) 
which, as a special case of irreversibility, is embedded in an area where nothing can be obvious. 
Subsequently (H2.21)  has  to  be treated as  a  hypothesis.  But  on the other  hand,  as long as  we 
consider irreversibility as a fact – and it would be very hard to do otherwise – (H2.21) also must be 
considered as a fact, and this despite its status of a hypothesis.
The strange nature of (H2.21)  – sharing the strangeness of irreversibility – necessarily has good 
chances to complicate any modeling of biological evolution “motorized” by cumulative selection. 
We will necessarily come back to this point. (see subsection 4.3) 
3. Current computer simulations related to biological evolution
In this section 3. we approach some simulations of cumulative selection: Richard Dawkins' famous 
weasel and biomorph programs as well as  “evolutionary algorithms” developed by Dave Thomas 
and Suzanne Sadedin. As a first step, we will consider the computer programs and the computer 
resources  required  by  these  programs  as  “given”,  in  order  to  examine  to  what  extent  the 
corresponding simulations  – under such necessarily reducing conditions  – (i)  effectively model 
biological evolution as it is supposed to manifest itself and (ii) remain design-free. But thereafter 
(see  subsections  3.2n;  section  4),  we will  be  obliged  to  ask  whether  in  the  area  of  biological 
evolution, modeling presupposing  “given” resources really can be adequate. It is at this level that 
the hypothesis (H2.21) and its consequences generate substantial complications.
3.1 Simulations from the perspective of given Maxwellian Demon-like devices
In subsection we 2.2 we saw that Maxwell's  thought experiment represents an absolutely plausible 
model of a simple case of cumulative selection, remaining consistent as long as we do not (need to) 
ask  where  the  Demon  is  coming  from.  From  this  perspective,  the  following  simulations  of 
cumulative selection represent significant analogies with Maxwell's Demon. Concerning the latter, 
as we saw  in  subsection  2.2, the thought experiment is not design-free, neither as a model, nor at 
the level of modeling. Maintaining provisionally the reducing approach ignoring the issue where (i) 
the required selection systems and (ii) the actually implemented modeling resources are come from, 
we now will examine whether the scenarios expressed by following simulations are as such  really 
design-free. The answer is rather complex. 
3.11 Dawkins' weasel-simulation
Referring to the famous Borelian typist monkeys supposed to reproduce randomly Shakespeare’s 
work,  Dawkins  rightly  says  that  it  would  already  be  hopeless  to  expect  the  purely  random 
reproduction of Hamlet's short  reply “Methinks it is like a weasel.” (Dawkins 1996, pp. 46 ff.) By 
contrast, it is astonishingly easy to reach the target “Methinks it is like a weasel” by  cumulative  
selection.  Dawkins considers  a computer  program initially displaying on the screen a senseless 
combination  of  28  characters  or  spaces,  say WDLMNLT  DTJBKWIRZREZLMQCO  P.  This 
combination is repeatedly duplicated by the program, but with very slight random errors Dawkins 
calls  “mutations.”  However,  the  actually  occurring  sequence  is  subjected  to  a  constraint:  the 
computer compares each new item and its predecessor to determine which one resembles more 
–  even  very  slightly –  the  target  METHINKS  IT IS  LIKE A WEASEL,  conserving  only  the 
relatively better solution and eliminating the other one. Launching his program, Dawkins obtains as 
a  first  “mutation”  to  be  conserved  WDLTMNLT   DTJBSWIRZREZLMQCO   P,  then,  10 
“generations”  later,  MDLDMNLS   ITJISWHRZREZ  MECS  P,  and  after  20  “generations” 
MELDINLS  IT  ISWPRKE  Z  WECSEL.  By  30  “generations”,  Dawkins  already  obtains 
METHINGS IT ISWLIKE B WECSEL, by 40 “generations” METHINKS IT IS LIKE I WEASEL, 
whereas the target METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL is fully reached in the 43th “generation.” 
Starting  from  two  different  initial  combinations,   the  simulation  reaches  the  same  target 
respectively  through 64 and 41 “generations.” (Dawkins 1996, pp. 47 f.; for more technical details, 
see Khomenko, 2004, pp. 1f.)
As well as Maxwell's Demon, the weasel simulation considered as a part of a model, is not design-
free. In both cases, the cumulative selection system could not reach the target if the latter was not 
previously designed. Dawkins himself qualifies his “monkey/Shakespeare model” as “misleading in 
important ways.” (Dawkins 1996, p. 50). Indeed, the cumulative small-step selection  characterizing 
the  weasel-simulation operates according to something Dawkins calls a “distant ideal target” (ibid.; 
Dawkins's emphasizing), or, if you prefer, to something virtual previously projected into the future, 
whereas natural selection according to synthetic theories defended by Dawkins precisely “has no 
long-term goal.” (ibid., comp. Khomenko, 2004, p.2) 
Now, in fact, the foregoing,  in its context, is  not a real problem. The weasel-simulation does not 
pretend to model biological evolution ,  nor its “motorization” by “blind” natural selection.  The 
weasel-simulation  is  conceived  in  order  to  demonstrate  the  extraordinary power  of  cumulative 
selection as such, or, if you prefer,  in order to show that cumulative selection easily can do things 
which under single-step selection conditions would be unimaginable. 
 
3.12 Dawkins' biomorph-simulations
Aware  that  his  weasel-simulations  are  not  design-free  –  even  in  the  very  restrictive  sense  he 
attributes  to  “design-freeness”  –  Dawkins,  in  order  to  show  that  design-free  –  “blind”  –  but 
meaningful increasing complexity is possible, also  conceives a second computer simulation with 
“biomorphs”, i.e. initially very simple computer images in fact reduced to some strokes. (Dawkins 
1996, p. 55). These biomorphs have “genes” conferring  them  their initial  configuration while 
transmitting the latter – but sometimes with slight random “mutations” –  to the next “generation” 
and so on.  In other words, the “genes” have two functions: the “development” of given individuals 
and the “evolution” of their “progeny.” The randomness of the “mutations” makes “evolution” in 
turn   aleatory.  On the  other  hand,  the  survival  of  these  “evolving”  biomorphs  is  submitted  to 
selection.  This  time,  the  selection  modalities  are  a  bit  more  complicated  than  in  the  weasel-
simulation. The survival of a mutated biomorph depends on its its relative degree of resemblance to 
a given “object” (see below) humans can recognize as such through its essential qualities. (Dawkins 
1996, p.  57) If  a mutated biomorph is more performing with regard to this criterion,  then it  is 
selected whereas its predecessor is eliminated. The opposite case implies the conservation of the 
predecessor and the elimination of the mutated biomorph. We still have to specify the nature of the 
given “object” that biomorphs, to survive, are supposed to resemble as well as possible. Dawkins 
evokes as an initial constraint the “resemblance to a weeping willow”, adding nevertheless that the 
selection is programmed to be capricious, passing  from the weeping willow reference to a different 
one and so on, and this for the simple reason that  natural selection operates through environmental 
pressure which changes over time. (Dawkins 1996, p. 57)
Once again, the simulation as such leads to  impressive results. Starting from trees just schematized 
in the most simple way, and hoping to reach “weeping willows, cedars of Lebanon, Lombardy 
poplars, seaweeds, perhaps deer antlers” (Dawkins 1996, p. 57), Dawkins in fact obtains incredibly 
complex and meaningful images – spiders, bees, bats, men, men with hats and even with decorated 
hats –  spread over numerous of pages of his Blind-Watchmaker book. (Dawkins 1996, pp. 57 ff.)
Nevertheless, independently of the fact that the biomorph-simulations, unlike weasel-simulations, 
operate without any   “distant ideal target”,  both types of simulation encounter the same serious 
problem which will be analyzed in the following subsection 3.130.   
3.13 Genetic algorithms
3.130 Structural complexity and functional complexity
Indeed,  both  approaches  –  weasel-  and  biomorph-simulations  –  first encounter  the  following 
difficulty: motivated by the attempt to show in the context of biological evolution  that design-free 
increasing complexity is  possible,  neither  the  weasel-  nor the biomorph-simulations  imply the 
specific kind of increasing complexity concerned by biological evolution. 
Strictly speaking,  the  weasel-simulations  do  not  treat  any kind  of  increasing  complexity.  They 
illustrate the possibility of reaching, by  cumulative selection, quasi-infinitely improbable targets 
single-step selection de facto never would reach. But as such, the target METHINKS IT IS LIKE A 
WEASEL  is  neither  more,  nor  less  complex  than  the  initial  configuration  WDLMNLT 
DTJBKWIRZREZLMQCO  P, and we can say the same for any other equivalent target or initial 
configuration.  The  fact  that  unlike  say  “KLZCO  BLIPWAQNBV  NFCERTWPAWP”, 
“METHINKS  IT IS  LIKE A WEASEL”  has  a  sense  is  without  any  importance  since  it  is  a 
social/cultural fact having nothing to do with biological evolution. On the other hand, the challenge 
of weasel-simulations exclusively is to reach previously given quasi-infinitely improbable targets, 
knowing that the respective improbabilities to reach KLZCO BLIPWAQNBV NFCERTWPAWP 
and  METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL are  equal. 
Concerning biomorph-simulations, there is certainly a kind of increasing complexity: even if each 
item occurring all along a biomorph-simulation is ultimately a configuration of simple strokes, men 
wearing hats decorated by flowers are more complex than the just-suggested trees being the start 
items  of  the  simulation.  But  obviously,  biological  evolution  cannot  be  reduced to  this  kind of 
increasing complexity. Living matter is characterized by functional complexity. So, a simulation of 
biological  evolution operating  exclusively with the  increasing  structural complexity of  pictures 
consisting of stroke configurations ignores the essential.
Now, are simulations of increasing functional complexity possible, and if so, to what extent?
This issue leads us to Dave Thomas' and Suzanne Sadedin's genetic algorithms. 
3.131 Dave Thomas' genetic algorithm
3.131-a  Motivation
Recall  that  according  to  Michael  Behe,  functional  complexity  –  Behe  calls  it  “irreducible 
complexity” – is incompatible with the synthetic theory of biological evolution, pointing out that for 
a  system characterized  by functional  complexity,  the  failure  of  a  sole  function  would stop the 
functioning of the entire system. So, simplifying, for Behe, the idea of a less performing precursor 
of a system characterized by functional complexity has no sense.  (Behe,  1996, p. 36) Standard 
arguments against Behe's view generally evoke the essential difference between mechanical systems 
and biological ones expressing among others plasticity. (comp. Brigandt, 2012, pp. 3 ff.)
Anyway,  in order  to show that  Behe's  argument cannot  hold,  Dave Thomas tries to simulate a 
system (i) characterized by functional complexity, which (ii) is supposed to evolve in a design-free  
way.
3.131-b Description
The aim of the simulation is to determine a solution to the  Steiner problem:  “(…) given a two-
dimensional set of points, find the most compact network of straight-line segments that connects the 
points.” (Thomas, 2010, pp. 43 f.)    
Simplifying a bit – for technical details, see  (Thomas, 2010, pp. 43 f.) – the simulation operates on 
“organisms”, here different potentially given networks characterized by their respective “DNA”, i.e. 
alphanumeric combinations which “when read by the transcription routine, supply three types of 
information about the network represented by each organism: the number of Steiner points, the 
numerical locations of these points, and a true/false connection map that dictates which points are to 
be connected by segments.” (Thomas, 2010, p. 44) The selection criterion striking these organisms 
is their degree of fitness with regard to the Steiner requirement. “The fitness function used tests for 
two  things:  Are  the  fixed  points  all  connected?  What  is  the  total  length  of  all  “expressed” 
segments?” (ibid.)        
3.131-c Discussion 
Now let us examine (i) whether the Steiner simulation  really generates an evolution of functional 
complexity and (ii) whether this evolution is simulated in a design-free way.   
Concerning point (i), I think that simulation does generate the evolution of authentically functional 
complexity.  Indeed,  on  the  one  hand,  the  degree  of  compactness  characterizing  a  given 
configuration  simultaneously  takes  into  account  all  the  characteristics  of  the  configuration  in 
question. On the other hand, for every path Pg leading to the relatively (see below) optimal solution, 
the precursor Sgh–1 of each selected Sgh step by definition is less adequate  than Sgh.
However, concerning point (ii), personally I am not so sure that the simulated functional complexity 
really evolves without human design. Recognizing that the “ID community” denies the validity of 
the simulation, qualifying the latter as target-oriented  (Thomas, 2010, p. 44), Thomas first advances 
as a counterargument that the simulation reaches only occasionally the exact Steiner solution, while 
converging most of the time on imperfect solutions. (ibid.) This argument is at least disputable. 
Consider an artist who, far from making “random art”, tries to realize a work corresponding as well  
as  possible  to  her/his  previous  intentions.  Now,  even  if  the  realized  work  does  not  exactly 
correspond to  the  intention  of  the  artist,  would-it  be  relevant  to  evoke a  “human design-free” 
realization? 
On the other hand, Thomas points out “(...) that the fitness function need not have any descriptions 
of the actual Steiner solution for any given set of points. Fitness, here, is not based on any specific 
future  function  but  only on  present  function.”  (ibid.)  and that  that  “(...)  the  specific  details  of 
complex  solutions  are  not  explicitly  embedded  in  the  overall  design  goals.”  (ibid.,  Thomas' 
emphasizing) A detailed analysis of the foregoing would take us too far. However, I think that the 
allegorical argumentation Thomas advances with regard to this point turns  against him. Indeed, 
Thomas' proposals “Stating the objective 'Build a vehicle that can carry men to the Moon and back' 
does not result in the spontaneous appearance of the complete plans for an Apollo spacecraft (with 
separate command, service, and lunar modules), along with a Saturn V launch vehicle.” (ibid.) are 
right as such. And yet, proposals like “Build a vehicle that can carry men to the Moon and back” do 
express human design with a potentially tangible impact. Simply speaking, for to reach the moon, 
saying “Build a vehicle that can carry men to the Moon and back” obviously is not sufficient. But 
without saying “Build a vehicle that can carry men to the Moon and back”, humans never would 
have reached the moon. And, in order to go a little further, note that there are significant analogies 
between the moon vehicle-story and Dawkins' weasel-simulation. Concerning the moon-story, there 
is a target: “Build a vehicle that can carry men to the Moon and back.” In order to reach the target,  
humans conceive solutions. A de facto given cumulative selection retains what is to be retained, 
eliminating that what is to be eliminated. So, contrary to a hopeless junkyard tornado strategy where 
just the Boeing liner is replacing the moon vehicle (Hoyle, 1983, p. 19), the project reaches its  
target. The logical structure of the weasel-simulation is not very different. Now, since Dawkins 
himself recognizes that the  weasel-simulation does respond to a “distant ideal target”, any denial, 
with regard to the moon project, of a “distant ideal target” would not be relevant. So there is no 
reason to say that Thomas' Steiner-simulation does not respond to a “distant ideal target”, even if 
– as well as within the weasel-simulation – the “distant ideal target” can be reached by an infinity of  
unpredictable paths. 
3.132 Some words about Suzanne Sadedin's simulation 
 
Sadedin  proposes  another  simulation  showing  that  –  contra  Behe  (Sadedin,  2006,  p.1)  –  an 
evolution  of  functional  complexity  is  possible.  (Sadedin,  2006,  pp.2ff.)  Because  of  space 
constraints, I cannot advance a detailed analysis. Here, I just would summarize the following points: 
(i) Sadedin's approach actually simulates evolving functional complexity; (ii) contrary to Thomas' 
simulation, Sadedin's approach indisputably simulates a design-free evolution with unpredictable 
results;  (iii)  nevertheless,  contrary  to  Thomas'  simulation  whose  “complexities”  are  “really 
complex”  – behind its apparent simplicity, the Steiner problem represents a highly challenging 
issue – Sadedin's approach just engages really simple structures: her simulation goes from relatively 
less  to  relatively  more  complex  configurations,  but  absolutely  speaking,  there  never  is  high 
complexity.         
3.14 Maxwell's Demon-like device stocktaking
A global  overview on all  simulations  related to  biological  evolution  we analyzed can  give the 
following impression. As long as the simulation in questions focuses on the power of cumulative 
selection  while  neglecting  simultaneously the  issues  of  design-freeness and  complexity,  very 
impressive results can be obtained. But for design-free evolution of complexity to be simulated, our 
task  seems  easier  as  long  as  we  exclude  really  functional  complexity.  Indeed,  concerning 
simulations of design-freely evolving  functional complexity, limiting constrains appear. Either, we 
consider “'really complex' functional complexity”: then the simulated evolution is not really design-
free.  Or,  we  want  to  simulate  really  design-free  evolving   functional  complexity:  then  the 
implemented  evolving functional complexity must be restricted to a non-significant minimum.
Certainly,  the foregoing does not repose on a formal  proof.  But anyway,  the essential problem 
remains before us. 
3.2 Going beyond the Demon-like device horizon?
3.21 Maxwell's Demon-like functions issued from cumulative selection?
Retake Maxwell's Demon. First, recall the motivation of the thought experiment. In order to qualify 
the Second “Law” of Thermodynamics as a  fact-like phenomenon not to be considered as law of 
nature, Maxwell tries to show that beings or entities more capable than humans could be able to 
violate  the Second “Law.” In the context  of  this  issue and regardless  of  the relevance or  non-
relevance we attribute to the thought experiment, there is no constraining reason to ask where the  
Demon comes from. On the other hand, Maxwell's Demon, even if probably it does not do the job 
for which its author had conceived it,  seems to model biological functions within living beings 
allowing the latter to increase their internal organization in a manner single-step selection never 
would allow (Kurzynski and Chelminiak, 2016, pp. 9f.,  see subsection 2.2). Anyway, studying a 
living  being  equipped  with  Maxwellian  Demon-like  functions,  there  is  in  turn  no  constraining 
reason to ask where these Demon-like functions are comes from, in the same way as we are not 
obliged to be interested in the evolutionary origins of the other biological functions of a living being 
we are studying as such. 
But now suppose that we consider biological evolution as – among others – a process leading to  
living beings equipped with more and more sophisticated (configurations of) Demon-like functions. 
In  this  case,  we  obviously  have  to  ask in  terms  of  evolution  theory  where these  Demon-like  
functions come from. Certainly, in terms of standard evolution theory, this question has its standard 
answer:  the  more  and  more  sophisticated  Demon-like  functions  characterizing  living  beings 
appearing all along biological evolution “motorized” by natural selection originate in turn  from 
biological  evolution  “motorized”  by natural  selection  as  a  special  case  of  cumulative  selection 
(comp. van Hateren, 2015, pp. 4 ff.). 
Well, but regardless of our choice to accept this explication or not, would we be able to model it in  
a design-free way?
This is not so sure. As long as we just use the Demon in order to model cumulative selection, say to 
bring a  gas into a quasi-infinitely improbable configuration, the fact that the Demon is a given, and 
more precisely a  human-designed device executing a task in turn  previously designed does not  
represent a problem. But now try to pass from this human-designed model to a design-free one. In 
this case, the Demon in turn must occur in a design-free way. But how?  
3.22 Return to modeling as a minimal experimentation-like approach 
Let us formulate otherwise the problem to be discussed. Current computer simulations of biological 
evolution based on cumulative selection need a  fitness function which selects or eliminates with 
regard  to  a  given  criterion  aleatory  occurrences  generated  by  the  simulation.  Obviously,  this 
criterion, as well as its corresponding fitness function are conceived by human design.
Now, the standard view claims that real biological evolution, contrary to its simulations, does not 
need specifically programmed  fitness  functions responding to  in  turn specifically programmed 
criteria.  Aleatory  given  constraints  –  say  the  pressure  of  environment  comprising  factors  like 
predators, preys rather able to escape, climatic conditions and so on – would operate the selection 
among aleatory mutations making the concerned organisms less or more fit with regard to theses 
constraints.  Briefly  speaking,  “nature”  would  have  its  own  resources  analogous  to  resources 
required by programmed simulations.
Well, but now recall that in our context, the role of a  model is not limited to illustrate the above 
mentioned standard conception dogmatically considered as an obvious truth. Quite the contrary, in 
our context, a model is supposed to test, in experimentation-like conditions, whether the standard 
conception is at least conceivable (see subsection 1.2) Since the standard conception  postulates a 
“nature” having design-free resources allowing a design-free evolution, it is indispensable to test the 
possibility of simulating a design-free evolution so that the resources required by  this simulation 
are in turn design-free. Unless we decree the  demonstrandum to be a previously given obvious 
truth, we have to examine whether beyond – more or less design-free –  models of cumulative 
selection, design-free modeling of biological evolution is possible. 
4. Trying design-free modeling of biological evolution
4.1Identifying the challenge
Until further notice, simulations of biological evolution require computer programs and computers 
able to execute them. Now, perhaps “nature” is a “great computer” which, having occurred in a 
design-free way, is able to write and to execute – always in design-free way – biological evolution 
in the form of a “computer program” whose processes are “motorized” like a computer. The latter 
point seems rather hypothetical and even a bit contradictory, knowing however that we can not 
categorically assert its non-possibility.
Anyway, recall that, before asserting the possibility of a design-free biological evolution, we at least 
have to be able to model biological evolution while respecting a very restrictive constraint: neither 
the model as such, nor the resources required by the corresponding modeling (see subsection 1.) can 
comprise  something  resembling  human  or  other  previous  design.  Obviously,  the  program 
expressing biological  evolution and the computer supporting the program are issued from human 
design.  From  the  perspective  of  present  day  knowledge  –  same  remark  as  for  “until  further 
notice”  – there is no tangible solution. All we can do is to envisage a purely virtual approach.
In subsections 2.2 and 2.21, we had recalled that any random system, to reach under cumulative 
selection conditions a target S*(ΣC) whose occurrence by single-step selection would be affected by 
an improbability  Imp(S*(ΣC)), requires an associated selection device  ASD(ΣC), knowing that the 
improbability Imp(ASD(ΣC)) affecting the occurrence by single-step selection of ASD(ΣC) is strictly 
higher than  Imp(S*(ΣC)). Intuitively speaking, a  given Maxwellian Demon, independently of any 
issue of energy degradation, allows a gas in equilibrium to reach a highly improbable order state it 
would not reach under conditions of single-step selection.  But obviously,  the occurrence,  under 
single-step selection  conditions, of the Demon itself would be unimaginably more improbable than 
the return of a gas in equilibrium to its ordered initial state. So, if for one reason or another we want  
a  design-free  occurrence  of  the  Demon,  then  the  unique  – virtual  –  solution,  a  supplementary 
cumulative  selection  process,  would  require  the  help  of  a   supplementary  associated  selection 
device, say a “super-Demon” SD, assuming that the single-step-improbability  Imp(SD) is in turn 
unimaginably  higher than the improbability  Imp(D) affecting the single-step occurrence of the 
Maxwellian Demon in question.
Subsequently,  if  we wish to  see  our  Maxwellian  gas  returning to  an unimaginably improbable 
initial  state,  and  this  thanks  to  a  globally  design-free  process  entirely  operated  by  cumulative 
selection, we  have to assume an infinite chain of “more and more superior” Demons SDi so that for 
any i, Imp(SDi+1) > Imp(SDi).
4.2An extension of the hypothesis H2.21 
In  a  more  general  way,  we  have to  reformulate  the  hypothesis  H2.21  for  entirely  design-free 
cumulative selection processes where  no associated selection device ASD can be considered as 
given, or, if you prefer, where any implemented ASD must be generated exclusively by  cumulative 
selection.
Hypothesis (H4.2) For  a  given  random  system  ΣC to  reach through a globally design-free 
cumulative selection process CSP(ΣC ) the target S*(ΣC) whose occurrence by single-step selection 
would be affected  by  an  improbability  Imp(S*(ΣC)), CSP(ΣC  ) must be supported by a chain of 
associated   selection devices ASDi, i = 1, 2, … … ∞, so that Imp(ASD1) > Imp(S*(ΣC)), whereas for 
any i, Imp(ASDi+1) > Imp(ASDi).
4.3 The status of the hypothesis  H4.2 
Like H2.21 (see subsection 2.21), its globally design-free extension H4.2 is trivial  while not being 
specific to the modeling of biological evolution.
Nevertheless, concerning our issue whether evolution as it is seen by the synthetic theory can be 
modeled in a design-free way, an explicit extension of H2.21 to  H4.2 is necessary.
H2.21 is  a  particular  expression  of  generalized  irreversibility:  if  a  system  Σi which  apparently 
violates irreversibility,  then  Σi must  be included in a wider  system  Σi+1 so that  irreversibility is 
globally reestablished at the level of Σi+1.
H4.2 is a particular expression of the following – obviously virtual – principle. If within a series  of 
systems   … Σi,  Σi+1, …,  Σi   ⊂ Σi+1,  any  system  Σi belonging to this series apparently violates 
irreversibility, then this series must be an infinite one.
So H2.21 and H4.2 have not  the same epistemic status.  Whereas  H2.21 until  further  notice is  
confirmed by  observable – natural as well as artificial – phenomena, H4.2 implementing an infinite 
series  of systems Σi  is more than problematic.  And yet, H4.2 directly concerns the possibility of  
modeling evolution in a globally design-free way.
Certainly, there is a potential objection: H4.2 is just a hypothesis; so the here above-mentioned 
problem is not an absolute one. Yes, but at this level, we can identically retake an important point  
already advanced with regard to H2.21. As well as the latter,  H4.2 is and remains a hypothesis 
because of the fact-like and not law-like status of irreversibility (see subsection 2.22). Nevertheless, 
as long as we accept irreversibility as a fact, we also must take seriously  H4.2 as well as H2.21.
Concerning cumulative selection, H2.21 implies the following consequence: far from circumventing 
irreversibility,  cumulative selection confirms its generalized diktat, whereas  H4.2 emanates from 
the insurmountable difficulties encountered by any attempt of circumventing irreversibility “despite 
all.”    
4.4 Back to a globally design-free modeling of evolution
H4.2  implies  that  any  cumulative  selection  process  CSP functioning  thanks  to  an  associated 
selection  device  ASD,  to  be  globally design-free,  requires  an  infinite  chain  …   ASDi,  …  , 
i = 1, 2, … … ∞, allowing the design-free occurrence of ASD which within a globally design-free 
CSP cannot be considered as “given.” Since reasonably the occurrence of each ASD i takes a time-
period different from zero, we may think at the first glance that our model would correspond to a  
biological evolution taking an infinite time-period, contradicting the finite age of our universe.
But in fact there is a much more serious problem.   
Evolution  is  characterized  by  the  occurrence  of  more  and  more  sophisticated  organisms.  So, 
modeling the passages from  given stages of evolution to the following ones necessitates more and 
more sophisticated devices ASD, and not just an unique ASD as is the case for Dawkins', Thomas' 
or Sadedin's simulations.
Now choose any passage from the stage Σi of evolution to the stage Σi+1. Call “ASDu” the associated 
selection device we have to integrate into our model of evolution in order to run by cumulative 
selection the transition  Σi →  Σi+1. As we saw above, the occurrence by cumulative selection of 
requires a series of associated selection devices  ASDu1,  ASDu2,   …  ASDur,  …, where r →  ∞. 
Obviously, it is the same for any other transition Σj →  Σj+1  and its required  ASDv.
Subsequently,  a  model  “explaining”  biological  evolution  exclusively by  design-free  cumulative 
selection  would correspond to a biological evolution where each passage from a given stage to the 
following one takes an infinite time-period.
4.5  A dichotomy
Now, the time period globally taken by the real biological evolution is finite. So, any even virtual 
attempt to model biological evolution exclusively on the basis of cumulative selection encounters 
the following dichotomy. Either the sole cumulative selection is not sufficient to explain biological 
evolution. Or biological evolution is entirely explained by cumulative selection which nevertheless 
comprises  factors  we do not  know until  further  notice.  In  both cases,  the  present  day state  of 




Of course, the foregoing does not prove scientifically that there must be previous design within 
biological evolution. But until further notice, the assertion that biological evolution “is design-free” 
belongs  to  speculation, and not more than speculation.
Now, independently of the personal position with regard to the faith or non-faith in God behind His 
Creation everyone among us is free to defend, the sole  scientific honesty suggests us to wonder 
which option, scientifically speaking, is more honest.
(i) To assume that the faith in God, by definition, is a belief?
(ii) Or to claim the possibility to “refute scientifically” ID while referring to “arguments” which, 
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